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Full Idea
If we describe a non-conceptual conscious state, we are aware of its character via the constitutive or 'built-in' awareness of content without need for a conceptual description, and so recognise that a conceptually formulated belief about it is correct.
Gist of Idea
Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
Source
Laurence Bonjour (A Version of Internalist Foundationalism [2003], 4.3)
Book Ref
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.73
A Reaction
This is Bonjour working very hard to find an account of primitive sense experiences which will enable them to function as 'basic beliefs' for foundations, without being too thin to do anything, or too thick to be basic. I'm not convinced.